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Noタイトル著者概要出版者・発行元出版年月誌名巻号開始ページ終了ページ記述言語査読の有無招待の有無掲載種別ISSNURL
1教育政策をめぐる政党間競争―選挙公約から見るイシューの変化大畠菜穂子2024年06月年報政治学2024Ⅰ4162有り研究論文（学術雑誌）
2教育公務員特例法改正にみる教員研修と人事評価大畠菜穂子2017年10月日本教育行政学会年報436380日本語無し有り研究論文（学術雑誌）
3戦後日本における教育委員会制度の制度設計―他の行政委員会との構造的類似性に着目して大畠菜穂子明星大学戦後教育史研究センター2014年03月戦後教育史研究278597日本語無し無し0916-4502http://id.ndl.go.jp/bib/025469163
4教育委員会と教育長の権限関係をめぐる立法過程 : 1949・50年の教育委員会法一部改正法案を中心に(II 研究報告)大畠 菜穂子In 1948, the Board of Education Law was enacted in Japan under the occupation policies aimed at promoting democracy and decentralizing education by following the model of the United States. The Board of Education system has been revised several times since then, but there has been no noticeable change to the provision concerning the relationship between the boards of education and their superintendents. Legally, the boards are an executive organ and have extensive legal authority over local education, whereas the superintendents are an auxiliary (subordinate) organ and thus have limited authority. Consequently, the superintendents should take charge of all education affairs managed by the boards, subject to the boards' "direction and supervision." However, in practice, the boards have little influence over the policy process, which favors the superintendents. How to improve the internal control of the boards has been a crucial problem in Japan. This article discusses the legal relationship between the boards of education and the superintendents. While the law's wording technically allows the boards to direct and supervise their superintendents' activities, the Ministry of Education has restricted the boards' power through administrative interpretations of the law. According to these interpretations, the boards can only outline policies and should not directly affect the activities of the superintendents. This article analyzes the discrepancies between the legal and administrative interpretations, focusing on the bill for partial revision of the Board of Education Law that was submitted to the Diet in 1949 but was dropped later. The bill was primarily aimed at reframing the relationship of these two entities. The first section of this article discusses the preparation of the bill by the Ministry of Education. Internal government documents show that the ministry intended to weaken the boards' control over the superintendents and strengthen the superintendents' authority by revising the term "direction and supervision" to "general supervision." This section also clarifies the bill's background and the difference between "direction and supervision" and "general supervision." The second section examines the Diet's deliberations in 1949 and 1950. In 1949, members of the opposition parties pointed out what they viewed as the main problem of the proposed revisions: weakening of the boards' control. The bill failed to pass during that session. It was resubmitted the next year and passed with no revision concerning "direction and supervision." Therefore, the attempt to reframe the relationship between the boards and superintendents was not fully accomplished through the legislative process. However, the administrative interpretations issued since 1952 can be identified as being more similar to the "general supervision" idea than the "direction and supervision" concept in a strict sense. Through these interpretations, the Ministry of Education has restricted the boards' control. In conclusion, the discrepancy between the law and the ministry's administrative interpretations makes the boards' responsibility less clear. Theoretical and empirical research is required to clarify how and to what extent the boards should control superintendents.日本教育行政学会2012年10月日本教育行政学会年報388298日本語有り無し0919-8393http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/110009675427
5教育委員会と教育長の権限関係 : 事務執行形態と指揮監督に着目した執行機関の比較分析大畠 菜穂子東北大学大学院教育学研究科2011年12月東北大学大学院教育学研究科研究年報6013556日本語無し無し1346-5740http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/40019231654
62007年地教行法改正にみる教育委員会の点検・評価制度の成立過程 : 教育委員会-教育長の指揮監督関係に注目して大畠 菜穂子日本教育制度学会2011年11月教育制度学研究18160174日本語有り無しhttp://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/40019164989
7地方教育行政における評価制度の導入 : 行政統制機能に着目した東京都中野区の事例分析(II 研究報告)大畠 菜穂子Evaluation systems have been rapidly introduced in the field of education in Japan since the late 1990s at the school, local, and national levels. Today, two types of evaluation systems are used in the administration of local educational institutions. One is the public sector evaluation system that has been implemented in the local governments. As per this system, the Board of Education should evaluate its programs using unified forms and processes, similar to mayoral bureaus. The other is the so-called "Inspections and Evaluations" system, which was enacted by the Law Concerning the Organization and Functions of Local Educational Administration in 2007. As per this system, the Board should perform evaluations on its own terms. This article examines the impact of these systems at the local government level from the viewpoint of democratic control over the administration of educational institutions. Evaluation systems have particular significance for democratic control over administrative bureaucracies. Over the past few decades, members of Boards of Education have played a limited role in policy processes, due to their "delicate" positions as appointed (as against elected) part-time members. In this situation, the new systems could provide them with effective means to control policy processes. It would also help us to analyze whether these systems promote democratic control. The first section of the present article discusses the characteristics of the two systems, including their similarities and differences. The second section deals with the case of the Nakano Ward Government (NWG), in which public sector evaluation has been implemented since 2001. The NWG evaluation system includes internal evaluation (self-evaluation) and external evaluation (by an evaluation committee). Interviews were conducted with ward staff and committee members and observations made of the external evaluation and a meeting of the Board of Education in 2009. The characteristics of the NWG evaluation system are revealed in comparison with the evaluation systems of other ward governments in Tokyo. In conclusion, while the public sector evaluation system emphasizes outcomes and cost benefits, the Inspections and Evaluations system stresses the status of programs rather than their outcomes and costs. In the NWG, the external evaluation committee, especially its local resident members, play active roles in the evaluation process, while the Board members have only limited passive roles. Some results of external evaluations concerning cost reduction have led to reforms, but other recommendations could not be put into practice. Consequently, the public sector evaluation system in NWG surpasses the Inspections and Evaluations systems of the other wards by offering more detailed and effective information ; however, as a means of democratic control, it has limitations. In the future, we should consider how evaluation systems work as an effective means of democratic control. In order to reach any generalization, additional empirical research of other cities should also be conducted.日本教育行政学会2010年10月日本教育行政学会年報36106122日本語有り無し0919-8393http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/110009553421